Why the Trump-Xi "trade truce" is a Trump-Xi "victory"

The headlines will call it a breakthrough. Markets will rally. Both presidents will claim victory.

But here's what I learned preparing for my appearance on CGTN's Global Business program: the real story of the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan, South Korea, isn't about who won or lost. It's about two leaders who've finally agreed on something fundamental—how to disagree without destroying the global economy.

After US tariffs spiked to 145% and Chinese rare-earth exports ground to a halt, both sides discovered an uncomfortable truth: neither can afford the costs of unbridled confrontation. This isn't a partnership. It's not even cooperation. It's something more pragmatic and potentially more durable—managed rivalry with guardrails.

The theater of US-China Relations

One of the best lenses for understanding the US-China relationship comes from an unexpected source: Christopher Buckley's satirical novel, They Eat Puppies, Don't They? Published in 2012, the book lampoons Washington's establishment and the complex, often cynical nature of US-China relations through the story of a defense contractor lobbyist working to stir up anti-Chinese sentiment to boost weapons sales artificially.

Buckley's insight—that belligerent public discourse is often driven by self-serving interests of politicians, defense contractors, and think tanks rather than genuine geopolitical conflict—feels even more prescient today than it did thirteen years ago. The novel captures something essential: much of the animosity in US-China relations is rooted in theatrical antics and paranoid maneuvering rather than unavoidable geopolitical forces.

Which brings us back to Busan and what's really happening beneath the surface.

The asymmetry everyone missed

The conventional wisdom frames this as a reset, rewinding the clock to early 2025 before tensions escalated. That's technically accurate but strategically misleading.

Trump and Xi aren't playing the same game. They're not even playing on the same timeline.

Trump measures success in headlines and market reactions. He's the ultimate day trader. He needs visible wins: tariffs coming down from 145% to around 45%, China repurchasing American soybeans, and movement on fentanyl precursor chemicals. These are tangible, marketable achievements he can sell domestically. The three- to four-hour meeting gets him back to Washington with a deal to announce.

Xi measures success in decades—or at least that's what Beijing wants the West to believe. What Xi's buying with tactical concessions—soybean purchases, easing rare-earth controls—is far more valuable than what he's giving up. He's buying time.

Time to achieve semiconductor self-sufficiency. Time to focus on domestic economic challenges while reducing external pressure. Time to pursue his five-year growth strategy centered on state-directed manufacturing and technology investments. And perhaps most importantly, he's securing something Beijing hasn't had since 2015: a formal state visit to Washington with all the symbolism and prestige that entails.

What China's rare-earth gambit revealed

Here's a data point that should worry every global business leader and multinational board member betting on stability: When China cut off exports of rare-earth magnets in April 2025, US automobile factories shut down, bond markets went into a tailspin, and stocks plummeted.

Beijing's message was unmistakable—and new. During Trump's first term, China's retaliation was measured and proportional. This time, Xi's playbook is different. His team spent the period after Trump's 2024 election victory designing an approach rooted in a simple insight: Trump is transactional, not ideological.

The rare-earth cutoff wasn't just about leverage in trade negotiations. It was a demonstration that China is willing to weaponize economic interdependence more aggressively than before. They watched Wall Street's reaction, gauged America's pain tolerance, and concluded they could press harder.

Yes, China eventually eased the restrictions. But they kept control of the supply chain. That's the pattern we're seeing in Busan: tactical retreats that don't surrender strategic advantages.

The real scorecard: What's not on the table

I've analyzed trade negotiations and worked to advance American trade agreements for two decades, and I've learned that what's excluded from discussions often matters more than what's included.

The Busan meeting deliberately sidesteps the structural issues that define US-China competition: China's massive state subsidies, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and state-directed industrial policy. Taiwan's status. The China-Russia relationship. China's expanding presence in Latin America and Africa.

These aren't oversights. They're conscious choices by both sides to focus on manageable disputes while acknowledging that core conflicts remain unresolvable for now.

China gets to continue its technological catch-up strategy without addressing American complaints about its state-led system. The US receives relief from immediate economic pain without securing structural reforms. Both leaders can declare victory because they're measuring success by different metrics.

What this means for your business strategy

If you're a global business executive or multinational board member, here's my advice based on what I'm seeing: treat this as a breathing space, not a resolution.

The tariff rollbacks and supply chain normalization are real and will provide relief. Port fee reductions for shipping will help operational costs. The predictability is welcome after nine months of chaos.

But don't reverse your diversification strategies. Don't re-concentrate exposure to China based on one summit. This meeting establishes rules of engagement for managed competition—it doesn't end the competition.

Specific actions I'm recommending:

First, stress-test your dependencies on rare-earth and critical minerals. China demonstrated it will use supply chain leverage more aggressively. Trump's rare-earth deals with Japan and Australia are the first steps, but alternative supply chains take years to build. Know your exposure.

Second, prepare for volatility to return within 6-12 months. Trump's track record shows he's prone to reversing course when domestic political pressures shift. The underlying tensions—technology competition, Taiwan, strategic rivalry—remain fully intact. And bashing China on the American campaign trail knows no bounds and certainly won't let up in next year's midterm elections.

Third, watch what they do, not what they say. Does China actually place large-scale soybean orders? Do rare-earth exports to US companies normalize? Does the US pause planned technology restrictions? Actions will tell you whether this détente has legs.

The six-month test

Here's what I'll be watching to gauge whether this holds:

The first test comes in 90 days. If China follows through on soybean purchases and the US genuinely pauses new tech restrictions, that would signal that both sides are committed to de-escalation.

The second test is Trump's proposed visit to Beijing in early 2026 — if he actually goes—and if Xi reciprocates with a Washington visit—that creates institutional momentum that's harder to reverse than ad hoc phone calls.

The third test is the one nobody's talking about: what happens when Xi stays in South Korea to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference after Trump jets off to return to the White House—Xi's positioning of China as the stable, reliable alternative to American unpredictability. If Asian economies begin hedging away from US alignment, that's a strategic win for Beijing that no tariff reduction can offset.

Bottom line

The Busan meeting isn't the end of US-China tensions. It's not even the beginning of the end. Anyone expecting a final resolution misunderstands the fundamental nature of this relationship—negotiations with China are permanent, not episodic.

What Busan represents is an agreement to establish rules for a long-term rivalry that both sides finally recognize they must manage rather than win outright. Trump gets his dealmaker moment. Xi gets time and symbolism. Markets get relief from chaos.

But the fundamental trajectory hasn't changed. We're still heading toward managed decoupling, just at a more controlled pace with fewer market-rattling surprises.

The smart money isn't betting on partnership or Cold War 2.0. The smart money is positioning for a world in which the US and China remain locked in strategic competition, with just enough dialogue to prevent it from spiraling into crisis.

That's not pessimism. It's realism. And it's the world business leaders need to navigate for the next decade.

Enjoy the ride + Plan accordingly.

-Marc

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Marc A. Ross is a geopolitical strategist and communications advisor, authoring a book entitled Globalization and American Politics: How International Economics Redefined American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics.

He is the founder and chief communications strategist of Caracal, a geopolitical business communications firm specializing in global business issues at the intersection of globalization, disruption, and politics. Additionally, he is the founder and curator of Brigadoon, a global network of founders and thought leaders shaping commerce and culture.

China's soybean shift reveals the fatal flaw in Team Trump's trade policy

Once supply chains reorganize, they don't come back. American farmers are learning this lesson the hard way.

In 2024, China bought $12.6 billion in US soybeans. This year: $0.

The collapse exposes a fundamental misunderstanding of how modern trade works. While Washington treats soybeans as a bargaining chip, Beijing recognized them as what they actually are: an intermediate input in a tightly integrated agricultural-industrial supply chain. Crushing facilities process soybeans into animal feed and oil, sustaining livestock production and food security. Disrupt one node, and the entire system reorganizes—permanently.

Twenty years ago, China learned this lesson the hard way when it lost control of its soybean-crushing capacity in 2004. It spent two decades ensuring that vulnerability would never recur. The US is now discovering the same principle from the opposite side.

The economics of concentration

The math is unforgiving. China imports 100 million to 105 million tons of soybeans annually, accounting for 60% of global trade. US farmers cannot replicate that demand elsewhere. More than 90 countries export soybeans, but Brazil, the United States, and Argentina dominate. For China, a concentrated buyer, diversifying supply sources is straightforward. For dispersed US sellers, finding equivalent markets is impossible.

Trump's 2018 tariffs accelerated China's diversification, but the infrastructure was already in place. Chinese investment had financed the ports, railways, and logistics networks moving South American soybeans to Asian markets. When tariffs disrupted US-China trade, the supply chain rerouted. Beijing's retaliatory tariffs made American soybeans prohibitively expensive, and Chinese buyers did not return.

US farmers typically sell more than half their soybean exports between October and December, after Brazil's February-March harvest season ends. If Chinese buyers continue to be absent, the upcoming quarter will inflict severe damage.

The Argentina paradox

The contradictions in the US trade and tariff strategy crystallize in Argentina. Washington recently provided Buenos Aires with roughly $20 billion in financial aid to prevent it from drifting into China's orbit. Argentina responded by scrapping export taxes, instantly making its soybeans more competitive, and then sold them to China.

The episode reveals how the US treats trade as a bilateral issue, whereas in reality, it operates multilaterally.

Tariffs may protect final assembled goods and industries with high switching costs, but they backfire catastrophically for intermediate goods in flexible supply chains where buyers easily substitute suppliers. The current Team Trump US trade policy fails to recognize this essential distinction.

The post-Brexit parallel

The parallels with the United Kingdom's post-Brexit trade policy are striking. Both strategies feature grand rhetoric about sovereignty and leverage, yet they ignore how complex supply chains adapt to disruption. Both overestimate their indispensability and underestimate adjustment costs.

Jun Du, professor of economics at Aston University, frames the problem precisely: "Once supply chains reorganize, they never return to their previous form."

The lesson

In modern trade, control over supply-chain nodes matters more than control over raw materials.

China lost its crushing capacity in 2004 and restructured its entire import strategy to prevent recurrence. The United States is losing access to its largest export market because it failed to understand that supply chains, once reorganized, don't revert simply because tariffs change.

American farmers are paying the price for that miscalculation.

-Marc

US-China trade war 2.0: Why this time is different

The US-China trade conflict just entered dangerous new territory, and the warning signs are flashing red across multiple fronts. If you've been treating tariff headlines as background noise, it's time to pay attention. The latest escalation carries implications that will reshape strategic planning for the next 18-24 months.

President Trump's announcement of 100% tariffs on Chinese goods, triggered by Beijing's restrictions on rare earth mineral exports, marks a qualitative shift in economic confrontation. China's commerce ministry responded with defiance, declaring it's "not afraid to fight." Markets reacted swiftly—the S&P 500 shed more than 2% as investors repriced risk. Meanwhile, diplomatic channels remain frozen, with Trump threatening to cancel his scheduled meeting with Xi Jinping.

Previous trade disputes centered on traditional manufactured goods and agricultural products. This conflict targets the circulatory system of modern manufacturing: rare earth elements essential for semiconductors, electric vehicles, defense systems, and consumer electronics. 

China's dominance in rare earth processing—controlling roughly 70% of global supply—gives Beijing asymmetric leverage. This isn't just another round of tit-for-tat tariffs; it's economic coercion aimed at critical infrastructure.

The automotive sector illustrates the real-world impact. Detroit's Big Three are projecting $7 billion in combined tariff-related losses for 2025. One industry executive didn't mince words, calling the situation "existential." When established manufacturers with century-old business models use that language, it signals structural disruption, not cyclical turbulence.

Here's what should concern every CEO: Financial Times research warns of "cracks in the foundation" despite surface-level economic resilience. The US economy has appeared to weather previous tariff rounds, but economists gathering at the IMF and World Bank meetings are questioning whether we're "living on borrowed time." Strong consumer spending and employment figures can mask deteriorating business investment and supply chain degradation—problems that compound quietly before manifesting suddenly.

China's economy presents its own vulnerabilities. Growth was already decelerating before this latest escalation, creating a scenario where neither superpower has much cushion for miscalculation. Think of two boxers, both already fatigued, deciding to escalate rather than clinch. The risk of systemic damage increases exponentially.

Bloomberg reports that Trump and Vice President Vance have "opened the door" to potential deals with China. But optimism should be tempered. The fundamental contradiction—deep economic interdependence paired with strategic competition—remains unresolved. As a Washington Post editorial aptly noted, this resembles "a couple headed for divorce but still cohabitating."

First, scenario planning must now include sustained trade conflict through 2026. The days of assuming diplomatic breakthroughs are over. Second, supply chain resilience is no longer a cost center—it's a competitive advantage. Third, China exposure requires explicit board-level governance and regular stress testing. Fourth, capital allocation decisions should factor in heightened geopolitical risk premiums.

The cheap globalization era has ended. 

The question facing leadership teams: Has your strategy evolved accordingly, or are you still operating with yesterday's assumptions in tomorrow's reality?

How is your organization navigating this new landscape?

Enjoy the ride + Plan accordingly.

-Marc