I predicted the Trump-Xi meeting would look like this. Now watch what happens next.

Markets don't lie. They don't care about Team Trump's narrative.

While Trump rated his meeting with Xi Jinping "12 on a scale of 1 to 10," markets delivered their own verdict: US stock futures barely moved. China's CSI 300 Index closed down 0.8%. That muted response tells you everything you need to know about what actually happened in those 90 minutes in Busan, South Korea.

The most telling aspect of the Trump-Xi meeting is the one-year timeframe. Both leaders are explicitly acknowledging that this truce is temporary. And markets, having seen this movie before, aren't buying the happy ending.

Ninety minutes to manage a superpower rivalry

Let's start with a number that should shock everyone: 90 minutes.

That's how long Trump and Xi met to address the world's most consequential economic relationship. Factor in translation, pleasantries, and opening remarks (Xi's comment that China's development goes "hand in hand with your vision to make America great again"), and you're looking at perhaps 45 minutes of substantive discussion.

Forty-five minutes to manage technology competition, rare-earth dependencies, trade imbalances, the future of the global economy, and China's "no limits" relationship with Russia.

The brevity isn't a talking point—it's the whole story.

This meeting wasn't a negotiation to resolve fundamental tensions. It was a carefully choreographed exercise in conflict management, with both sides achieving exactly what they needed while avoiding anything that might require actual structural change.

What China achieved

Here's where conventional analysis gets it wrong. Yes, China agreed to resume soybean purchases and suspend the draconian rare-earth export restrictions announced on October 9th. Team Trump's messaging and global news headlines framed these as concessions.

But look at what China extracted in return: US tariffs dropped from 57% to 47%. Technology export restrictions that were under consideration got postponed, not eliminated. Port fees on the Chinese maritime and logistics industries are suspended for a year. And most importantly, Beijing maintained the April licensing regime for rare earths—the opaque system that frustrates American manufacturers and keeps control firmly in Chinese hands.

Xi didn't surrender strategic advantages. He made tactical retreats while extracting meaningful US concessions on issues that matter more to China's long-term positioning.

The rare-earth gambit earlier this year—cutting off magnet exports, forcing US auto plant shutdowns, triggering bond market turbulence—was never just about leverage in one negotiation. It was a demonstration. Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to weaponize supply chains more aggressively than during Trump's first term. They watched Washington's reaction, gauged America's tolerance for pain, and concluded they could press harder.

The message was unmistakable: China has demonstrated its capacity to retaliate. Washington would do well to remember it.

TACO = Trump Always Chickens Out

Taiwan wasn't discussed. Neither were trade imbalances. Or Chinese industrial subsidies. Or intellectual property theft. Or the structural competition for technological supremacy that defines this rivalry.

I've worked on trade negotiations and global politics for two decades, and here's a pro-tip: what's excluded often matters more than what's included. These omissions weren't failures of diplomacy—they were conscious choices acknowledging that core conflicts remain unresolvable.

China hawks in Washington can be relieved that Trump didn't grant China access to Nvidia's flagship AI chips or soften the US commitment to Taiwan. But let's not pretend that avoiding disastrous outcomes is the same as achieving positive ones.

As Jonathan Czin, a fellow at the Brookings Institution who previously analyzed Chinese politics at the CIA, noted in a New York Times article: "I think it's an approach that can safely be described as tactics without a strategy." China, by contrast, has a clear long-term strategy—namely, its recently announced five-year plan, which focuses on state-directed manufacturing and technology investments.

What markets already know

The lack of market enthusiasm tells you sophisticated investors understand something the headlines miss: "We've heard this playbook before—optimistic tone, little follow-through."

Markets wanted a concrete joint statement. They wanted structural commitments. Instead, they got a handshake, diplomatic pleasantries, and a one-year timeframe that explicitly acknowledges the temporary nature of this truce.

Even after the 10-point tariff reduction, the effective US rate on Chinese goods remains above 40%—vastly higher than the roughly 3% historical norm. Calling this "normalization" requires selective amnesia about what normal actually looked like.

The CSI 300's 0.8% decline in closing is particularly revealing. Chinese investors, despite their government securing meaningful concessions, recognized that this doesn't change the fundamental trajectory. Strategic decoupling continues—just at a more managed pace.

Strategic decoupling vs. Full decoupling

Let me be precise about terminology, because the distinction matters enormously.

We're not seeing full decoupling—the complete separation of the world's two largest economies. That would be economically catastrophic and politically unsustainable for both sides.

We're seeing strategic decoupling: the deliberate reduction of dependencies in areas deemed critical to national security and technological competitiveness. Semiconductors. Rare earths. AI. Quantum computing. Advanced manufacturing.

As Stephen Jen of Eurizon SLJ Capital wrote in a note to clients: "Make no mistake, the two countries are drifting apart and are frantically building their own autonomous economic ecosystems."

The outcome from this meeting doesn't reverse that drift. It acknowledges it while establishing guardrails to prevent the drift from becoming a crash.

What this means for your business

If you're a CEO, supply chain executive, or board member, here's my direct advice: the tariff reductions and supply chain normalization are real and welcome. Use them. But don't mistake a one-year truce for a strategic realignment.

Three specific actions

First, accelerate supply chain diversification. China demonstrated in April that it will use economic weapons more aggressively. The rare-earth licensing regime remains in place. American companies are already continuing to seek non-Chinese sources despite this deal. Follow their lead.

Second, the price of volatility returns within 12 months. The one-year timeframe isn't arbitrary—it's both sides buying time to reduce strategic dependencies. When this expires in late 2026, the landscape will be different because both sides will have used the time strategically. Trump's mercurial nature and America's 2026 midterm elections add additional unpredictability.

Third, watch actions over words. Does China actually place large-scale soybean orders, or is this another promise that fades? Do rare-earth exports genuinely normalize, or does the licensing regime continue creating bottlenecks? Does the US truly pause new technology restrictions? The implementation phase will reveal whether this has substance.

The 90-day test

Here are the specific signals I'm watching:

Within 90 days, will China follow through on its agricultural purchases and the US genuinely pause its planned tech restrictions, which suggests that both sides are committed to making this work—at least temporarily?

In April 2026, Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing. If this actually happens (and if Xi's reciprocal visit to Washington occurs), it creates diplomatic momentum harder to reverse than ad-hoc summits. State visits require comprehensive preparation, meticulous protocol, and significant political capital. Additionally, the American business community will have an extensive list of issues and pressure points to address to secure more Chinese market access.

The immediate aftermath saw Trump jet back to Washington for a Halloween party. Xi stayed in South Korea for the full APEC summit, engaging regional leaders. The optics matter: China positioning itself as the stable, reliable partner versus American transactional unpredictability. If Asian economies hedge away from US alignment, that's a strategic victory no tariff rollback can offset.

The reality check

Both leaders got what they needed, and they are both political athletes.

Trump secured visible wins to sell domestically—such as tariff reductions, soybean purchases, and cooperation on fentanyl. His "12 on a scale of 1 to 10" assessment reflects genuine satisfaction with the optics.

Xi achieved something more valuable: time and strategic positioning. Time to pursue semiconductor self-sufficiency. Space to focus on domestic economic challenges without external pressure. Control of critical supply chains despite tactical easing. And a framework for formal state visits that signals great power parity.

But for global businesses caught between these superpowers, the ugly reality persists: underlying conflicts remain unaddressed. Commerce will be rocky for years to come.

The fundamentals haven't changed. This remains the world's most complex, competitive relationship. What changed in Busan isn't the destination—it's the agreement to make the journey less chaotic for the next twelve months.

Markets understood this immediately. The sophisticated response wasn't pessimism—it was realism about what a 90-minute meeting can and cannot accomplish.

Bottom line

The Trump-Xi meeting in Busan succeeded at precisely what it was designed to do: establish guardrails for managed rivalry while avoiding mutually assured economic destruction. That's valuable in a relationship where the global economy, regional security, and technological leadership are serious issues.

But let's not confuse conflict management with conflict resolution. The technology competition continues. The trade imbalance persists. Taiwan remains unaddressed. China's support of Russia continues unchecked. Strategic decoupling accelerates.

The smart money is positioning for a world where these economies remain locked in long-term competition with just enough dialogue to prevent a crisis. That's the world we're navigating.

Markets called it correctly on day one. Everything else is just narrative, spin, and messaging.

-Marc

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Marc A. Ross is a geopolitical strategist and communications advisor, authoring a book entitled Globalization and American Politics: How International Economics Redefined American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics.

He is the founder and chief communications strategist of Caracal, a geopolitical business communications firm specializing in global business issues at the intersection of globalization, disruption, and politics. Additionally, he is the founder and curator of Brigadoon, a global network of founders and thought leaders shaping commerce and culture.

Why the Trump-Xi "trade truce" is a Trump-Xi "victory"

The headlines will call it a breakthrough. Markets will rally. Both presidents will claim victory.

But here's what I learned preparing for my appearance on CGTN's Global Business program: the real story of the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan, South Korea, isn't about who won or lost. It's about two leaders who've finally agreed on something fundamental—how to disagree without destroying the global economy.

After US tariffs spiked to 145% and Chinese rare-earth exports ground to a halt, both sides discovered an uncomfortable truth: neither can afford the costs of unbridled confrontation. This isn't a partnership. It's not even cooperation. It's something more pragmatic and potentially more durable—managed rivalry with guardrails.

The theater of US-China Relations

One of the best lenses for understanding the US-China relationship comes from an unexpected source: Christopher Buckley's satirical novel, They Eat Puppies, Don't They? Published in 2012, the book lampoons Washington's establishment and the complex, often cynical nature of US-China relations through the story of a defense contractor lobbyist working to stir up anti-Chinese sentiment to boost weapons sales artificially.

Buckley's insight—that belligerent public discourse is often driven by self-serving interests of politicians, defense contractors, and think tanks rather than genuine geopolitical conflict—feels even more prescient today than it did thirteen years ago. The novel captures something essential: much of the animosity in US-China relations is rooted in theatrical antics and paranoid maneuvering rather than unavoidable geopolitical forces.

Which brings us back to Busan and what's really happening beneath the surface.

The asymmetry everyone missed

The conventional wisdom frames this as a reset, rewinding the clock to early 2025 before tensions escalated. That's technically accurate but strategically misleading.

Trump and Xi aren't playing the same game. They're not even playing on the same timeline.

Trump measures success in headlines and market reactions. He's the ultimate day trader. He needs visible wins: tariffs coming down from 145% to around 45%, China repurchasing American soybeans, and movement on fentanyl precursor chemicals. These are tangible, marketable achievements he can sell domestically. The three- to four-hour meeting gets him back to Washington with a deal to announce.

Xi measures success in decades—or at least that's what Beijing wants the West to believe. What Xi's buying with tactical concessions—soybean purchases, easing rare-earth controls—is far more valuable than what he's giving up. He's buying time.

Time to achieve semiconductor self-sufficiency. Time to focus on domestic economic challenges while reducing external pressure. Time to pursue his five-year growth strategy centered on state-directed manufacturing and technology investments. And perhaps most importantly, he's securing something Beijing hasn't had since 2015: a formal state visit to Washington with all the symbolism and prestige that entails.

What China's rare-earth gambit revealed

Here's a data point that should worry every global business leader and multinational board member betting on stability: When China cut off exports of rare-earth magnets in April 2025, US automobile factories shut down, bond markets went into a tailspin, and stocks plummeted.

Beijing's message was unmistakable—and new. During Trump's first term, China's retaliation was measured and proportional. This time, Xi's playbook is different. His team spent the period after Trump's 2024 election victory designing an approach rooted in a simple insight: Trump is transactional, not ideological.

The rare-earth cutoff wasn't just about leverage in trade negotiations. It was a demonstration that China is willing to weaponize economic interdependence more aggressively than before. They watched Wall Street's reaction, gauged America's pain tolerance, and concluded they could press harder.

Yes, China eventually eased the restrictions. But they kept control of the supply chain. That's the pattern we're seeing in Busan: tactical retreats that don't surrender strategic advantages.

The real scorecard: What's not on the table

I've analyzed trade negotiations and worked to advance American trade agreements for two decades, and I've learned that what's excluded from discussions often matters more than what's included.

The Busan meeting deliberately sidesteps the structural issues that define US-China competition: China's massive state subsidies, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and state-directed industrial policy. Taiwan's status. The China-Russia relationship. China's expanding presence in Latin America and Africa.

These aren't oversights. They're conscious choices by both sides to focus on manageable disputes while acknowledging that core conflicts remain unresolvable for now.

China gets to continue its technological catch-up strategy without addressing American complaints about its state-led system. The US receives relief from immediate economic pain without securing structural reforms. Both leaders can declare victory because they're measuring success by different metrics.

What this means for your business strategy

If you're a global business executive or multinational board member, here's my advice based on what I'm seeing: treat this as a breathing space, not a resolution.

The tariff rollbacks and supply chain normalization are real and will provide relief. Port fee reductions for shipping will help operational costs. The predictability is welcome after nine months of chaos.

But don't reverse your diversification strategies. Don't re-concentrate exposure to China based on one summit. This meeting establishes rules of engagement for managed competition—it doesn't end the competition.

Specific actions I'm recommending:

First, stress-test your dependencies on rare-earth and critical minerals. China demonstrated it will use supply chain leverage more aggressively. Trump's rare-earth deals with Japan and Australia are the first steps, but alternative supply chains take years to build. Know your exposure.

Second, prepare for volatility to return within 6-12 months. Trump's track record shows he's prone to reversing course when domestic political pressures shift. The underlying tensions—technology competition, Taiwan, strategic rivalry—remain fully intact. And bashing China on the American campaign trail knows no bounds and certainly won't let up in next year's midterm elections.

Third, watch what they do, not what they say. Does China actually place large-scale soybean orders? Do rare-earth exports to US companies normalize? Does the US pause planned technology restrictions? Actions will tell you whether this détente has legs.

The six-month test

Here's what I'll be watching to gauge whether this holds:

The first test comes in 90 days. If China follows through on soybean purchases and the US genuinely pauses new tech restrictions, that would signal that both sides are committed to de-escalation.

The second test is Trump's proposed visit to Beijing in early 2026 — if he actually goes—and if Xi reciprocates with a Washington visit—that creates institutional momentum that's harder to reverse than ad hoc phone calls.

The third test is the one nobody's talking about: what happens when Xi stays in South Korea to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference after Trump jets off to return to the White House—Xi's positioning of China as the stable, reliable alternative to American unpredictability. If Asian economies begin hedging away from US alignment, that's a strategic win for Beijing that no tariff reduction can offset.

Bottom line

The Busan meeting isn't the end of US-China tensions. It's not even the beginning of the end. Anyone expecting a final resolution misunderstands the fundamental nature of this relationship—negotiations with China are permanent, not episodic.

What Busan represents is an agreement to establish rules for a long-term rivalry that both sides finally recognize they must manage rather than win outright. Trump gets his dealmaker moment. Xi gets time and symbolism. Markets get relief from chaos.

But the fundamental trajectory hasn't changed. We're still heading toward managed decoupling, just at a more controlled pace with fewer market-rattling surprises.

The smart money isn't betting on partnership or Cold War 2.0. The smart money is positioning for a world in which the US and China remain locked in strategic competition, with just enough dialogue to prevent it from spiraling into crisis.

That's not pessimism. It's realism. And it's the world business leaders need to navigate for the next decade.

Enjoy the ride + Plan accordingly.

-Marc

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Marc A. Ross is a geopolitical strategist and communications advisor, authoring a book entitled Globalization and American Politics: How International Economics Redefined American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics.

He is the founder and chief communications strategist of Caracal, a geopolitical business communications firm specializing in global business issues at the intersection of globalization, disruption, and politics. Additionally, he is the founder and curator of Brigadoon, a global network of founders and thought leaders shaping commerce and culture.

China's soybean shift reveals the fatal flaw in Team Trump's trade policy

Once supply chains reorganize, they don't come back. American farmers are learning this lesson the hard way.

In 2024, China bought $12.6 billion in US soybeans. This year: $0.

The collapse exposes a fundamental misunderstanding of how modern trade works. While Washington treats soybeans as a bargaining chip, Beijing recognized them as what they actually are: an intermediate input in a tightly integrated agricultural-industrial supply chain. Crushing facilities process soybeans into animal feed and oil, sustaining livestock production and food security. Disrupt one node, and the entire system reorganizes—permanently.

Twenty years ago, China learned this lesson the hard way when it lost control of its soybean-crushing capacity in 2004. It spent two decades ensuring that vulnerability would never recur. The US is now discovering the same principle from the opposite side.

The economics of concentration

The math is unforgiving. China imports 100 million to 105 million tons of soybeans annually, accounting for 60% of global trade. US farmers cannot replicate that demand elsewhere. More than 90 countries export soybeans, but Brazil, the United States, and Argentina dominate. For China, a concentrated buyer, diversifying supply sources is straightforward. For dispersed US sellers, finding equivalent markets is impossible.

Trump's 2018 tariffs accelerated China's diversification, but the infrastructure was already in place. Chinese investment had financed the ports, railways, and logistics networks moving South American soybeans to Asian markets. When tariffs disrupted US-China trade, the supply chain rerouted. Beijing's retaliatory tariffs made American soybeans prohibitively expensive, and Chinese buyers did not return.

US farmers typically sell more than half their soybean exports between October and December, after Brazil's February-March harvest season ends. If Chinese buyers continue to be absent, the upcoming quarter will inflict severe damage.

The Argentina paradox

The contradictions in the US trade and tariff strategy crystallize in Argentina. Washington recently provided Buenos Aires with roughly $20 billion in financial aid to prevent it from drifting into China's orbit. Argentina responded by scrapping export taxes, instantly making its soybeans more competitive, and then sold them to China.

The episode reveals how the US treats trade as a bilateral issue, whereas in reality, it operates multilaterally.

Tariffs may protect final assembled goods and industries with high switching costs, but they backfire catastrophically for intermediate goods in flexible supply chains where buyers easily substitute suppliers. The current Team Trump US trade policy fails to recognize this essential distinction.

The post-Brexit parallel

The parallels with the United Kingdom's post-Brexit trade policy are striking. Both strategies feature grand rhetoric about sovereignty and leverage, yet they ignore how complex supply chains adapt to disruption. Both overestimate their indispensability and underestimate adjustment costs.

Jun Du, professor of economics at Aston University, frames the problem precisely: "Once supply chains reorganize, they never return to their previous form."

The lesson

In modern trade, control over supply-chain nodes matters more than control over raw materials.

China lost its crushing capacity in 2004 and restructured its entire import strategy to prevent recurrence. The United States is losing access to its largest export market because it failed to understand that supply chains, once reorganized, don't revert simply because tariffs change.

American farmers are paying the price for that miscalculation.

-Marc