The arrest of Nicolás Maduro represents more than a dramatic shift in US-Venezuela relations. It signals the emergence of a doctrine that business leaders cannot afford to ignore: a fundamental reordering of American strategic priorities that treats the Western Hemisphere as a sphere of direct enforcement rather than a realm of foreign policy.
Call it the "FAFO Doctrine."
An American unilateralist framework that redefines what constitutes a foreign intervention. When Trump characterizes Venezuelan state dysfunction not as a geopolitical problem but as "domestic policy with a foreign address," he's not engaging in rhetorical flourish. He's articulating a strategic vision with profound implications for how American power will be exercised in the coming years. Trump is shaping a world in which deeply interconnected domestic American issues and foreign affairs intersect, with foreign actions affecting domestic interests.
Echoes of Monroe, reimagined for 2025
This isn't entirely new territory. The intellectual foundations of hemispheric dominance trace back two centuries to the Monroe Doctrine, which declared the Americas off-limits to European intervention. What's different now is the inversion of that logic: rather than keeping others out, Trump is asserting the right to operate freely within this space, treating migration, narcotics, and organized crime as justifications for direct action that transcend traditional foreign policy constraints.
The framing matters enormously. Notice that Maduro wasn't "deposed"—he was "arrested." The operation wasn't wrapped in humanitarian language about democracy and freedom, as Bush did in Afghanistan or Obama did in Libya. Instead, it was presented as law enforcement, a sheriff's takedown announced via social media rather than an Oval Office address. This is border enforcement by other means, and it fundamentally rewrites the rules of engagement for the hemisphere.
The geographic hierarchy of American interests
Trump's confidantes speak of a "hemispheric defense" spanning from Greenland and the Arctic to the Panama Canal, then to Latin America and the Pacific. Under this framework, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia become what strategists call "discretionary theaters"—places the United States might engage or abandon based on immediate calculus rather than strategic commitment.
For business leaders navigating global supply chains and investment decisions, this hierarchy demands attention. The eight-decade stability of containing Moscow, the North Star that organized American foreign policy and, by extension, shaped global economic architecture, has dimmed considerably. If the US treats Ukraine as a discretionary theater while asserting direct enforcement authority in Venezuela, what does that mean for the predictability of American commitments elsewhere?
Alliance uncertainty as a strategic variable
Long-time American allies are asking exactly this question. When the foundation of the postwar order, like say Article 5 commitments, forward deployment, and nuclear umbrellas, becomes uncertain, risk premiums adjust accordingly. Capital flows shift. Defense budgets reallocate. Regional powers make independent calculations about security guarantees.
This isn't abstract geopolitics; it's the operating environment for every multinational corporation. If European allies doubt American reliability, they'll pursue strategic autonomy. If Asian partners question defense commitments, they'll recalibrate their relationships with Beijing. Each of these adjustments cascades through trade relationships, regulatory frameworks, and market access.
Strategic implications for corporate leadership
The business community needs to recognize three immediate implications:
First, regulatory and operational risk in the Americas increases significantly. If the United States treats the hemisphere as a zone of direct enforcement, companies operating from Mexico to Argentina face heightened uncertainty about political stability, governance, and the potential for unilateral American action that disrupts operations.
Second, the reliability of transatlantic and transpacific partnerships faces new pressure. Supply chains built on assumptions of American alliance stability may require hedging strategies. Diversification isn't just about China anymore; it's about the foundational predictability of American commitments.
Third, the distinction between foreign and domestic policy blurs in ways that affect corporate strategy. When immigration becomes a justification for military action, when drug trafficking triggers regime change, the traditional toolkit of international business, maintaining political risk insurance, exercising diplomatic channels, and utilizing multilateral frameworks, this government relations and public affairs playbook requires fundamental reassessment.
Navigating the new "FAFO Doctrine"
We're witnessing the emergence of a post-globalization order where the intellectual consensus that built the modern system—from Bretton Woods to the G20—no longer enjoys White House support.
The question isn't whether this is good policy (reasonable people disagree), but whether business leaders are prepared for the volatility it creates.
The Venezuela operation isn't an isolated incident. It's a declaration of intent about how American power will be exercised in this hemisphere, and by implication, how it won't be exercised elsewhere. For corporate strategists, the task is straightforward: stop planning for the world as it was and start preparing for the world as it's becoming, one
where geographic proximity to the United States matters more than alliance commitments, and where the boundaries between domestic enforcement and foreign intervention have effectively disappeared.
That's not the world many of us would prefer. But it's increasingly the world we're getting.
And in strategy, as in business, wishful thinking is expensive.
Enjoy the ride + plan accordingly.
—Marc
Marc A. Ross
Founder + Chief Strategist @ Caracal Global
caracal.global
